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 Franz-Josef Meiers 
Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. 
Elections: From Rift to Harmony?
1 
Many outside the United States, Europeans in particular, reacted with 
“shock and awe” to the result of the presidential election of 2 November 
2004. President Bush, whom an overwhelming majority never liked and 
many had grown to resent,
2 was re-elected by a country that many observ-
ers thought they knew and understood. Values had trumped policies, as a 
God-fearing nation embraced the perceived morality of a Christian presi-
dent in spite of misgivings about Iraq, unemployment, budget-deficits and 
even his competence. His consequential, controversial presidency will be 
extended by four more years, this time with a popular mandate: 59,5 mil-
lion Americans (51 percent) voted for Bush, 56 million (48 per cent) for his 
Democratic challenger, Senator John F. Kerry. Bush´s straight-talking like-
ability, his perceived strong leadership in protecting the country against 
international terrorism, and his appeal to religious conservatives as de-
fender of a  traditional American moral values like the institution of mar-
riage outweighed the appeal of what Americans acknowledged to be 
Kerry´s superior intellect. 
 
1 I would like to thank my colleague Thomas Banchoff, Associate Professor of Gov-
ernment, Georgetown University, Washington DC, for the careful reading of my 
draft paper. 
2 Global poll says Kerry preferred over Bush, Financial Times, 9 September 2004; Eu-
ropäer wünschen mehr Unabhängigkeit von Amerika, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung 9 September 2004; World opinion a world apart, Financial Times, 9 September 
2004; and Jennifer Joan Lee, Vote in U.S. inflames Europeans, International Herald 
Tribune, 27 October 2004. 
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It was remarkable that Bush could overcome the issues of war and jobs that 
would have sunk most other candidates. The decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court last year to approve gay marriage helped the mobilization 
of traditionalist and fundamentalist religious voters. Countless Ohioans did 
not vote their wallet but their cultural values The Massachusetts court deci-
sion was “a lightening bolt that hit right in the pulpit and ignited the whole 
congregation”, according to Phil Burress, who ran the Ohio initiative cam-
paign.
3  No other state lost as many industrial jobs as Ohio but nevertheless 
voted against their economic self-interest which, in the end, gave the in-
cumbent the 20 electoral votes to lock up his majority of 286:252 in the 
electoral college. With undivided power in Washington, political con-
straints seem to have disappeared at home. Bush may view his victory, 
matched by a crushing defeat of the Democratic Party in the Congressional 
elections – the Republican Party will increase their majority in the Senate 
from 51 to 55 – as a vindication of his domestic and foreign policies. Four 
years after the disputed election he won a popular vote that he can no 
longer considered a one-term accident of history. He vowed to use the “po-
litical capital” gained from his victory to push an aggressive domestic 
agenda in a second term. He will move quickly within the next 18 months 
before the mid-term election in 2006 will edge him toward lame-duck 
status to pursue conservative priorities reflecting “the will of the people,” 
like limiting medical malpractice lawsuits, revamping the tax code and add-
ing private accounts to social security.
4 
In spite of Bush´s abundantly clear victory – he gained 8,6m votes more 
than in 2000 – and the expansion of Republican majorities in both houses 
of Congress for the first time since Calvin Coolidge, the president has made 
little headway in establishing a generational Republican majority in the 
country. The election revealed again deep cleavages in American society, 
splitting citizens by region, gender, religion, marital status, sexual orienta-
tion, values and education level. Almost half of the voters felt that victory 
for the other side would mean disaster for the nation. President Bush has 
 
3 David S. Broder, An Old-Fashioned Win, Washington Post, 4. November 2004. 
4 President Holds Press Conference [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/2004 
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now the second and last chance to show them they were wrong. He can ad-
dress the national yearning for economic and fiscal stability, a financially 
sound social security system and adequate spending on homeland security 
– but such an effort will require bipartisan action. Moderation, however, 
seems an endangered word amid the exultation of the Republicans. The 
paradox of the presidential and congressional elections is that President 
Bush may sooner than later be forced to choose between his conservative 
supporters on the Hill like Tom Delay, the majority leader in the House, 
who strongly argue that he should use his presidency to usher in a Republi-
can ascendancy, and the president´s pledge to bridge the partisan divide 
and look for common ground with the Democrats. The imbalance of an un-
divided government will trigger “Rayburn´s law”: “When you get too big a 
majority, said the Democratic Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, after 
F.D.R.´s 1936 landslide, “you´re immediately in trouble.” To “break the 
second-term jinx” Bush faces the politically delicate and sensitive task of 
sticking to the principles than elected him while overcoming the deep di-
vide within the country and on Capitol Hill.
5 
The state of relations with the European allies is a reflection of a country 
deeply divided. The crisis over Iraq revealed deep rifts within the transat-
lantic alliance and among Europeans. The lesson of the first term is that the 
world does not always bend to Washington´s will. At his press conference 
on 4 November, he declared that he will “continue to reach out our friends 
and allies, our partners in the EU and NATO, to promote development and 
progress, to defeat terrorists and to encourage freedom and democracy as 
alternatives to tyranny and terror.” Reality is the greatest constraint on 
President Bush, from macroeconomics to the war in Iraq, which require 
bipartisanship at home and strengthened cooperation with the European 
allies. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the most loyal European ally of 
President Bush before and after the Iraqi war, made two important points to 
America´s angry allies when he spoke about the election results. One was 
 
5 William Safire, The Dangers of Lopsidedness, New York Times, 4 November 2004; 
Lou Cannon, Can Bush Break the Second-Term Jinx?, Washington Post, 9 Novem-
ber 2004; and David Gergen, The Power of One, New York Times, 19 November 
2004.  Franz-Josef Meiers 
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that is the right time for the US President to reach out to America´s tradi-
tional allies and time for the rest of the world to accept that Mr. Bush will 
be around for the next four years and must be dealt with as the choice of 
the American people. The other is that the critical goal of stability in the 
Arab world will never be achieved unless the United States assumes the 
critical role of being the driving force of the peace process between Israel 
and the Palestinians.
6 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell emphasized the 
president´s desire “to work with Europe, … to get over the disagreement of 
2003 over Iraq.” The US administration would continue “a policy of work-
ing multilaterally to deal with problems like the nuclear issue in Iran”.  He 
declared that the president would “work very actively to get the Road Map 
moving forward.” He left no doubt that President Bush, with a clear man-
date from the American people, would continue pursuing his “aggressive” 
foreign policy when dealing with “challenges” and “issues”, in particular 
the Global War on Terror. He would not “trim his sails or pull back. It´s 
going to be a continuation of his principles, his policies, his beliefs.” 
American foreign policy would be “multilateral in nature”, but the United 
States would reserve the right “to act alone” where necessary or “with a 
willing coalition to defend our interests and our needs.”
7 The French For-
eign Minister Michel Barnier recalled that France, in spite of the recent 
surge of “French bashing”, is among the “best friends” and one of the 
“most solid partners” of the United States - both countries work closely in 
the fight against terrorism as exemplified by French special forces fighting 
side by side with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Americans and Europeans 
have much to do “together” to promote democracy, security and develop-
ment. In the Middle East, on top of the agenda is “to turn Iraq into a real 
success story.” The deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be bro-
ken, “the source of a number of other conflicts and serves as the pretext for 
numerous acts of terrorism.” He continues: “Let us revive  the Road Map 
and reactivate the Quartet” – the United States, the European Union, Russia 
 
6 Prime Minister congratulates President Bush [http:www.number-10.gov.uk/output/ 
Page6528.asp].  
7 Interview by Hubert Wetzel and Guy Dinmore of Financial Times [http://www.state. 
gov/secretary/rm/ 37937pf.htm]. See also Bush ´will still pursue aggressive´ line 
abroad, Financial Times, 9 November 2004. Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections 
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and the United Nations in support of a final settlement of the Middle East 
conflict. The European partners “must be ready to accompany any effort in 
this direction with financial support, but also with an international presence 
on the ground.” Because of common interests everywhere, America and 
Europe should have common ambitions. “America needs a Europe capable 
and responsible” while “Europe needs an America strong and engaged in 
world affairs based on multilateralism … and convinced that the world 
needs rules and rules respected by all.” In a unstable and dangerous world, 
he concludes, “our alliance is more necessary than ever.”
8  
The re-election of President Bush raises two related questions: What will a 
second Bush term mean for Europe? What contributions can Washington 
expect from its European allies to prevail in the war against terror, against 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in the stabilization and 
democratisation of the Middle East? Unquestionably Irak, Iran and the Pal-
estinian-Israeli conflict will be at the top of the transatlantic agenda within 
the next four years. Doubts, however, remain whether the transatlantic se-
curity community can leave the very significant disagreement of 2002-2003 
over Iraq behind and agree on a common approach to cope with the secu-
rity threats of the emerging 21
st century as they had proved so successfully 
for more than four decades during the East-West conflict. Some, like 
Robert Kagan, argue that the changing structure of U.S.-European relations 
– in particular the great and growing imbalance of power and the funda-
mental differences in the worldviews – will inevitably lead to a “transatlan-
tic divide” and the emergence of “a long era of American hegemony”.
9 
Others like NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer argue that the 
partnership between Europe and America will remain as important in the 
21
st century as it used to be during the cold war. The new “enlighted” atlan-
ticism will move beyond the transatlantic world view of the past towards 
the requirements of the present and the future. “The agenda of the new 
 
8 Michel Barnier, Lettre á un ami américain, Le Monde, 10 November 2004; and Mi-
chel Barnier, A Letter to America, Wallstreet Journal, 8 November 2004. 
9 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, 
Alfred A. Knopf: New York 2003, pp. 4, 88. Franz-Josef Meiers 
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NATO is nothing less than the agenda of a new future-oriented transatlantic 
security community.”
10 
The following discussion will analyse the pattern of transatlantic conver-
gence or divergence in the three most pressing issues which will be at the 
top of the transatlantic agenda within the next four years: the stabilization 
of post-war Iraq, the revamping of the Middle East peace process, and the 
management of the proliferation risks emanating from Iran´s nuclear pro-
gram. In addition, efforts of the European partners to strengthen the Euro-
pean Security and Defense Policy (EDSP) within the institutional frame-
work of the European Union (EU) and U.S. concern that a stronger ESDP 
could undermine the alliance and weaken the transatlantic link will be ana-
lyzed.  
The focus of the paper is on the need to overcome not only the rift across 
the Atlantic, but also the division between “new” and “old” Europe. So 
long as there are serious transatlantic tensions, Europe will not be able to 
develop effective foreign policies. And, as long as Europe is divided on 
crucial question of how to cope with U.S. power, a healthy transatlantic 
relationship is impossible.
11  
The paper`s main thesis is that transatlantic relations at the beginning of the 
21
st century are as important as during the Cold War. Both the United 
States and Europe face new global security risks and threats that, in almost 
every case, can be dealt with far more successfully if they act together „The 
good we can do together is far greater than the good we can do apart,“ as 
President George W. Bush rightly said during his visit to Poland in 2002. 
Needed is a “strategic consensus” spanning across the Atlantic which iden-
 
10 Die Zukunft der transatlantischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft, speech by NATO Secre-
tary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the „Welt am Sonntag Forum“, Berlin, 8 
November 2004 [www.nato.int/docu/speech/ 2004/s041108a.htm]. 
11 Charles Grant, Six Proposals for a More Effective EU Foreign Policy, in: Werner 
Weidenfeld et al. (eds), From Alliance to Coalitions – The Future of Transatlantic 
Relations, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers: Gütersloh 2004, pp. 141-159 (141). Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections 
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tifies core elements of a common vision of threats and opportunities, and 
strengthens the means of cooperation to address common goals.
12  
1.  Internationalization: the Stabilization of Iraq 
The Iraq crisis of 2002-2003 has been one of the worst, perhaps the worst 
together with the Suez-crisis of 1956, in transatlantic relations since the end 
of World War II. The Bush administration was absolutely convinced that 
the gathering WMD threat posed by the despotic regime of Saddam Hus-
sein could only be averted by a regime change in Baghdad, while only a 
portion of European allies were prepared to go along. Many allies, in par-
ticular France and Germany, were concerned that U.S. military intervention 
in Iraq would become a pattern of the only superpower taking offensive 
actions against terrorism with global reach without common decision-
making in the alliance and without the blessing of the United Nations. 
There are numerous negative developments in the country, many the result 
of mistaken U.S. policies. On post-war Iraq, U.S. intelligence agencies un-
derestimated the decrepit state of the Iraqi infrastructure, failed to predict 
the role played by Saddam Hussein´s paramilitary forces and did not fore-
see a second counter-insurgency war.
13 The Coalition Provisional Authority 
and the U.S. military failed to make a serious effort to train Iraqi military 
and security forces properly in the year following Saddam Hussein´s fall.
14 
To compound the problem, the Bush administration ignored the lessons of 
previous post-conflict reconstruction. They did not see the symbiotic rela-
tionship between nation-building and long-term commitments as the 
 
12 Opening Remarks of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at the ambassadors´ confer-
ence, Berlin, 6 September 2004 [www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/archiv_print 
?archiv_id=6120]; and James B. Steinberg, An Elective Partnership: Salvaging 
Transatlantic Relations, in: Werner Weidenfeld et al. (eds), From Alliance to Coali-
tions – The Future of Transatlantic Relations, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers: 
Gütersloh 2004, pp,  89-105 (90). 
13 Michael R. Gordon, The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War, New 
York Times, 19 October 2004. 
14 Michael R. Gordon, Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military, 
New York Times, 21 October 2004; and Anthony Cordesman, Iraq is not lost, but 
US strategy is, Financial Times, 20 September 2004. Franz-Josef Meiers 
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American architects of the post-war international system clearly did. One 
big reason last year´s “mission accomplished” started to look like “mission 
impossible” was the that Pentagon planners provided only enough troops to 
defeat Saddam Hussein´s crumbling armies and not enough to provide  se-
curity for physical and political reconstruction from day one after the statue 
of Saddam had tumbled in Baghdad. Securing the peace takes more, not 
fewer, soldiers than winning the peace.
15  
The daily pictures of the sole superpower being bogged down in a counter-
insurgency war with uncertain outcome show the illusion and hubris of 
President Bush´s foreign policy during the first four years. Iraq looks less 
like a beachhead for democracy than a failed state in the making. The de-
pressing prospects of post-war reconstruction efforts show the growing gap 
between U.S. military means and political ends to shape the world to its 
interests and ideals. Tackling the Iraqi challenges would indeed be a very 
demanding task if the United States were in the best of shape. But is not. 
The Iraq experience exposes the erroneous assumptions on which the Bush 
doctrine of unchallenged U.S. power rests:  
•  the limits of U.S. omnipotence: The foundation of U.S. economic growth 
is vulnerable. The federal budget surplus of $ 236 billion turned into 
deficit of more than $ 400 billion, or more than 4 per cent of U.S.GDP. 
The current account deficit is expected to be more than $ 600 billion this 
year, or almost 6 per cent of the U.S. GDP. The U.S. accumulated debt 
to foreign investors is $ 2,6 trillion or 23 per cent of  U.S. GDP. The 
private household saving rate has fallen to 0,5 per cent, compared with 
12 per cent in the euro area. These imbalances suggest that America´s 
future may be a lot less rosy. Some economists see parallels today with 
the dollar´s collapse in the 1970s, when the Bretton Woods system 
broke down. Like today, that was of large budget deficit, loose mone-
tary policy and rising oil prices, and America faced open-ended costs to 
pay for the Vietnam war.
16 Furthermore, U.S. superior conventional 
 
15 James F. Dobbins, America´s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, Sur-
vival 45 (Winter 2003/04) 4, pp. 87-110. 
16 Checking the depth gauge, The Economist, 13 November 2004, p. 88. 
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military power is severely stretched in fighting two wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. Half of the Army 33 brigades are currently deployed in Af-
ghanistan (2) and Irak (15). The redeployment of 650 British troops to a 
region south of Baghdad to cover for a U.S. unit drafted into the offen-
sive against insurgents in Fallujah indicates how thinly stretched U.S. 
troops are in the central region.  Pentagon planners are forced to extend 
the tours of troops, to put greater reliance on reservists, and extend re-
serve call-ups as well. Efforts to jump-start reconstruction and to quench 
the resistance of insurgent militias will make their task even more diffi-
cult: they have to find additional troops - the equivalent of several 
bataillions, or about 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers.
17 
•  the exaggerated belief in force: There is a huge gap between U.S. lethal 
military efficiency and its actual ability to bend events to its will. The 
very fact that U.S. marines had to fight so fiercely to retake terrorist 
sanctuaries like Fallujah, 18 months after President Bush had declared 
“mission accomplished”, is a sign of how close U.S. Iraq policy is tee-
tering towards the abyss. Even with more troops in the field the United 
States can probably win any tactical engagement, but that is, as it was in 
Vietnam, irrelevant. The textbook victory in Fallujah highlights the di-
lemma U.S. forces face in fighting insurgents: the hard-hitting combat 
tactics of U.S. marines are not necessarily the most effective. It has not 
brought the United States appreciably closer to achieving its political 
objectives in Iraq, in particular gaining the support of the Iraqis, notably 
the Sunnis. If Sunni hostility continues to deepen, Fallujah could turn 
into a Pyrrhic victory. The tactical success on the battlefield must meet 
the approval of the population. Otherwise, the application of the most 
efficient U.S. military means will only play into the hands of the insur-
gents. The operational lesson of Fallujah is that taking cities is compara-
tively easy, but that holding them is harder and ultimately decisive.
 18 
 
17 Costly Troop Deficit in Iraq, New York Times, 22 November 2004; and Officers See 
Need For Bigger Iraq Forces, Washington Post, 22 November 2004. 
18 Charles Clover, Postwar Violence, Financial Times, 21 October 2004; Shlomo Avin-
eri, Playing into Saddam´s hands, Financial Times, 10 November 2004; Eric 
Schmitt, The Goal is Met. What´s Next?; New York Times, 15 November 2004; Franz-Josef Meiers 
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•  the irrelevance of allies: The Iraq war shattered three of the building 
blocks of a functioning alliance: strategy, consensus, coalition. The 
Bush administration moved away from what was once the accepted pat-
tern of employing political diplomacy supported by military might to 
the application of military might supported by the hope that diplomacy 
will subsequently lead to success. Efforts at finding consensus have 
been replaced by the new operating principle: “coalitions of the will-
ing.” European voices had been given little consideration by the Bush 
administration for the European allies lack, with the exception of the 
United Kingdom, efficient expeditionary forces as an option. This ap-
proach effectively reduced the alliance to a military self-service organi-
zation for any number of political coalitions. The more the Bush ad-
ministration continues to play the unilateral bully, the more its soft 
power, i.e. attraction, the power of persuasion and legitimacy will fade.  
Common crimes, persistent lawlessness and attacks committed by former 
regime loyalists and other forces are the greatest impediment to Iraq´s eco-
nomic and political reconstruction.
19 The situation in Iraq, particularly in 
the Sunni triangle, remains highly precarious. If Sunni hostility continues 
to deepen, Fallujah could turn into a hollow victory. The triple challenge 
facing the United States in Iraq is to quench the resistance of armed insur-
gents mainly in the Sunni triangle, to provide as quickly as possible the ba-
sic elements to the people, i.e. water, electricity, security, schools, admini-
stration, and to head off a large-scale boycott by Sunni voters of the Iraqi 
elections scheduled for January. This will require the commitment of more 
U.S. forces already stretched thin, for Iraq´s security forces are not ready 
for the demanding task and probably will not be for the next two years. In 
short, there is no “exit strategy”. The conditio sina qua non of a successful 
reconstruction of Iraq will be the willingness of the Bush-administration to 
 
The Larger Battle in Iraq, New York Times, 15 November 2004; Daryl G. Press and 
Benjamin Valentino, A hollow victory, International Herald Tribune, 18 November 
2004; Thomas L. Freedman, Iraq at the Tipping Point, New York Times, 18 No-
vember 2004; and Jackson Diehl, Fallujah´s Fallout, Washington Post, 22 Novem-
ber 2004. 
19 Cadriana Lins de Albuquerque, Michael O´Hanlon and Amy Unikiewicz, The State 
of Iraq: An Update, New York Times, 26 November 2004. Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections 
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remain meaningfully engaged in Iraq for years to come. The alternative 
would be a hasty withdrawal from Iraq which would lead inevitably to the 
worst-case outcome for the United States, the Iraqis, the neighbouring 
countries, the region and the entire world: a descent into Lebanon-like 
chaos and civil war that would quickly spread beyond Iraq´s borders and 
destabilize politically and economically fragile neighbours such as Saudi 
Arabia or Jordan.
20 In short, the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq af-
ter the quick defeat of the armies of Saddam Hussein will indeed be a 
“long, hard slog” as Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense admitted in a 
leaked memorandum in November 2003.  
The United States cannot achieve what it wants except in the context of the 
involvement of the international community. Some degree of the inter-
nationalisation John Kerry so strongly argued for during the campaign is 
the only realistic path towards stability inside Iraq, and sustained domestic 
support in America. To succeed with its goal of liberating Iraqi from a ruth-
less dictator and of establishing a democratic system in Baghdad critically 
depends on the willingness of the Bush administration to embrace the 
Kerry version of rapprochement and reach out to European allies for help.
21 
On the European side, especially in France, there is an equal need to recog-
nize Europe´s genuine interest in a successful outcome in Iraq, rather than 
standing aloof and telling the world “Iraq is Iraq´s and America´s responsi-
bility”. The “spectators” of the war should become involved in the rebuild-
ing of Iraq. The European allies must find some way to help meaningfully 
in Iraq: a failure there would do them as little good as it would the rest of 
the world. “If the gap is to bridged, it has to be done from the European 
side and not from the United States … We cannot afford to see Iraq go up 
in flames. It is in everyone´s obligation that we get Iraq right”, Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer, NATO´s secretary general, concluded.
22 José Manuel Bar-
 
20 Kenneth M. Pollack, After Saddam. Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq, Analysis 
Paper No. 1, The Sabban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution: 
Washington, D.C., January 2004. 
21 David Ignatius, Bush´s New Start with France, Washington Post, 16 November 
2004. 
22 Warren Hoge, NATO chief criticizes terror ´gap`, International Herald Tribune, 12 
November 2004. Franz-Josef Meiers 
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roso, the new head of the EU commission, said in an interview, that Euro-
peans should “leave behind our disagreements on Iraq” and “give a posi-
tive, strong contribution to the Iraqi problem.”
23 In short, the issue that 
helped divide the alliance, now provides an opportunity for uniting it. The 
post-war restructuring of Iraq is evolving into a transatlantic task. 
The alliance, together with the European Union, could become the institu-
tion of choice, when a military and political-economic element in nation-
building is needed. One option could be sending units of a European rapid 
reaction force to Iraq. It would give Germany a European cover to change 
its position, and if Germany changed its position, the pressure on France to 
do the same would be intense. It would force the EU governments to make 
good on their pledge to build an independent European force. It would 
demonstrate that such a force would not be part of a French-inspired effort 
to weaken NATO and to counterbalance the United States. And most im-
portant, it might contribute to what ought to be the ultimate goal of Euro-
pean-American relations: to help assure a stable, prosperous Iraq.
24 
It is appears highly unlikely that Europeans, will send more troops; the 
Netherlands, Poland and Hungary have all signaled their intention to bring 
their troops home by the end of 2005.
25 It is still out of question for both 
France and Germany to send troops to Iraq, but they can be persuaded to 
increase their contributions to peacekeeping operations on the Balkans and 
in Afghanistan. By assuming greater responsibility for peace and interna-
tional security – the EU will take over the NATO-run mission in Bosnia-
Hercegovina by the end of 2004 and the European NATO allies committed 
more forces to  Kosovo and Afghanistan (where NATO troops serve under 
two French generals), the European partners could reduce the burdens on 
America´s overstretched armed forces and release them for some other ur-
gent tasks in Iraq. Michèle Aillot Marie, the French Minister of Defense, 
 
23 Help U.S. with Iraq, executive of EU says, International Herald Tribune, 21-22 Au-
gust 2004.  
24 Richard Bernstein, New sense of urgency over U.S.-Europe ties, International Herald 
Tribune, 29 October 2004. 
25 Judy Dempsey, Poland unexpectedly says troops may quit Iraq in 2005, International 
Herald Tribune, 5 October 2004. Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections 
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pointed out that Europe is taking its responsibility as European forces form 
the “backbone” of NATO´s operations.
26 
Furthermore, they could make a tangible contribution to the training of 
Iraq´s military and security forces. The North Atlantic Council approved a 
military training program in Iraq on 8 October 2004; 16 of the 26 allies 
have agreed to send up to 300 military instructors backed up by around 
2,000 guards and support staff to Iraq. NATO officials are worried about 
the refusal of some member countries like France and Germany to allow 
officers posted to alliance staff positions.
27 Both countries have insisted 
they will not send under any circumstances troops to Iraq. Instead, they 
have offered to help with training Iraqi forces outside of the country.
28 The 
German government appears to be prepared to withdraw German officers 
from those alliance staff positions which are assigned to NATO´s military 
training program in Iraq.
29 Scheffer warned that this stance could under-
mine the unity of NATO´s integrated military command and the political 
cohesion of the Alliance “If there is a political consensus within NATO 
about the training mission, it is important that all officers working in 
NATO´s integrated military staffs participate.” General Harald Kujat, 
 
26 Für Frankreich sind die Europäer mittlerweile das Rückgrat der NATO-Einsätze, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 September 2004; Michele Alliot-Marie, Europe 
is in better shape than ever to face crises, Financial Times, 17 September 2004; und 
Craig S. Smith, Eurokorps Waves EU Flag in Afghanistan, International Herald 
Tribune, 23 September 2004. 
27 Enhancement of NATO Assistance to Iraq [www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/09-
september/e0922.htm]; Jean-Pierre Stroobants and Laurent Zecchini, Accord limité 
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tung, 9 October 2004. 
28 For the French position see Corine Lesnes, Jacques Chirac : « Notre politique en Irak 
ne changera pas », Le Monde 22 September 2004; Corine Lesnes, La France “ne 
s´engegera pas militairement” en Irak, Le Monde 25 September 2004. For the Ger-
man position see Kanzler stellt klar: Keine Bundeswehrsoldaten in den Irak, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 October 2004; Schröder denies change to policy on 
Iraq force, Financial Times, 14 October 2004; No troops for Iraq, Germany reaf-
firm, International Herald Tribune, 15 October 2004;  
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chairman of NATO´s Military Committee, warned that such a withdrawal 
would “cause difficulties. We don´t have too many experts who can rotate. 
It´s important that everybody contributes. There is a certain obligation.”
30 If 
the German government does not honour its commitment to a NATO-
training mission in Iraq, it will become an accomplice to a policy strongly 
advocated by the Pentagon hawks: the move away from common action 
towards coalitions of the willing. 
Another critical task for U.S., Iraqi, and international authorities is to se-
cure materials and equipment that could be used in chemical, nuclear or 
biological weapons. Equally important are programs that bolster the barri-
ers and disincentives for former Iraqi weapons scientists and technicians 
who could help terrorists or rogue states acquire these lethal capabilities. 
Together with the European allies the United States could take a similar 
approach to the one it has applied to the former Soviet Union. This should 
be one of the most important tasks in lieu of the disappearance of 377 tons 
of conventional explosives usable as detonators in nuclear weapons from 
bunkers which had been sealed by IAEA inspectors before the U.S. inva-
sion.
31 
Short of helping out with forces, the European allies should find it in their 
interest to augment their contributions to the U.N.-run national elections 
and actively participate in the tasks of political and economic reconstruc-
tion. Here, they could bring in their experience in reforming administrative 
structures and rebuilding the essential elements of Iraq´s infrastructure, i.e. 
water, electricity, telecommunication. Another area could be debt relief. 
The French agreed to a compromise formula to forgive more than half of 
Iraq´s $ 2,9 billion debt to France. The Paris Club of 19 creditor nations 
agreed on 22 November 2004 to write off 80 per cent of 42 billion that Iraq 
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owes them. Iraq owes another 80 billion to various Arab countries.
32 Fi-
nally, the French government agreed that the only scenario for progress is a 
successful Iraqi election on 30 January 2005. It urged Iraq´s Sunni interim 
president, Ghazi al-Yawar,  during a visit to Paris on 30 November 2004 to 
remain on board for the elections on which the successful reconstruction of 
the country critically depends on He had been highly critical about the U.S. 
assault in the Sunni stronghold of Fallujah and argued for a delay of the 
national elections to ensure a comprehensive effort to bring disaffected 
Sunni Muslims into the political process.
33 An international conference on 
Iraq attended by twenty representatives of the United States, Russia, 
France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Arab countries as well as heads 
of four major regional or international organizations in Sharm, el-Sheikh on 
23 November 2004, supported the idea of Iraq´s proceeding with its politi-
cal transition as outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, passed 
last June. They called on the Iraqi government to meet with its political op-
ponents to encourage them to participate in the national elections. “The 
message is clear that the elections and ballot boxes are the only solution to 
the crisis of security in Iraq,” Jordanian Foreign Minister Hani Mulki said. 
Michel Barnier, the French Foreign Minister, declared that the message of 
the conference was that only the political process could solve Iraq´s prob-
lems.
34 The biggest worry is that if too few Sunnis participate in the coun-
try´s first democratic elections in January 2005, the result will be deemed 
illegitimate and the insurgency will continue unabated. 
In conclusion, the post-war restructuring of Iraq evolves into a central 
transatlantic task. Rather than remain fixed on past quarrels, the European 
allies would be well advised to work with the Bush administration to 
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achieve their common objectives. Those lie, above all, in a stable, prosper-
ous and peaceful Iraq. “Chaos in Iraq benefits nobody except those who 
share the apocalyptic version of Osama bin Laden and his friends,” as The 
Economist rightly put it.
35 
2.  Moment of Truth: the Reinvigoration of the Road 
Map 
The most crucial issue facing President Bush in his second term and the 
European allies is the Middle East peace process British prime minister 
Tony Blair called “the single most pressing political challenge in our world 
today.” The message he took to Washington in early November 2004 was 
to restore momentum into the defunct Middle East peace process plan the 
Bush administration should be ready to “seize aggressively”
36 the opportu-
nity presented by the Palestinian leadership transition and the decision of 
the Israel´s prime minister Sharon to pull out all Israeli settlements from 
Gaza. The main task is to demonstrate that diplomacy carries tangible 
benefits for the Palestinians and the Israelis alike.
37 
If there was once a “peace process”, there is now little peace and even less 
process. The terror campaign of Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad and the 
stiff and uncompromising response of the Israeli government, i.e. the delib-
erate targeting of high-ranking members of the Palestinian terror groups or 
the build-up of a wall to prevent further terror attacks from the West Bank, 
have left the peace process moribund.  The diplomatic stalemate has been 
deepened because America and the European allies, notably France, were 
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perceived as partisans, the former as the champion of Israel´s goals, the lat-
ter of the Palestinian claims. Since 2001, the EU has shown it is ill-
equipped to play the broker´s role. The only country that could play this 
role shunned the peace process it saw as a synonym for sterile Middle East-
ern chatter and declared Yasser Arafat a persona non grata with whom 
President Bush could not and would not work with, or trust. Throughout its 
first term, the Bush administration argued that the road to Jerusalem passed 
through Baghdad. The new comprehensive approach aimed at a regional 
democratic transformation, beginning in Iraq and extending to a corrupt 
and terror-tainted Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat. This democ-
ratic transformation would open the door to an Israeli-Palestinian settle-
ment. However, Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, the mismanagement of the oc-
cupation of Iraq and the excessive use of U.S. military forces in retaking 
the insurgent stronghold Fallujah have proven disastrous to America´s im-
age and credibility as a honest broker in the Arab world. The widespread 
perception among Arabs that an even-handed U.S. approach to the Middle 
East was impossible as long as hard-line supporters of Ariel Sharon were 
“embedded” in the White House,
38 further undermined the U.S. role of a 
honest broker vis-à-vis the Arab and Palestinian parties. 
With the decision to go into Iraq the United States no longer has the luxury 
of treating the Middle East policy as a series of unrelated events. President 
Bush faces the need for simultaneous actions to avoid failed states while 
reducing the incentives to violence and instability that threaten both Amer-
ica, friendly Arab states throughout the region, and the European allies.
39 It 
is likewise true that America and the European allies, including all the 
members of the European Union, have a great deal at stake in what happens 
with Palestinian-Israeli peace process. This requires a deep, sustained com-
mitment of the United States and a visible engagement of the president. But 
American resolve will not suffice without the willing engagement of other 
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states, especially those of Europe and the region itself. The key player who 
is detested so thoroughly in the Arab world particularly after the invasion 
of Iraq cannot go it alone and needs to include the European players con-
structively into the peace process. They can provide the requisite financial 
resources, expertise and troops to turn the road map from vision to manifest 
reality. 
The road map plan agreed on by the United States, the EU, Russia and the 
U.N. in 2003 should be revived and fortified by actions; the plan outlines a 
series of reciprocal steps by Israel and the Palestinian leaders ending with 
the establishment of a Palestinian state. The outlines of such a settlement, 
by the otherwise stagnation of the process, have become much less con-
tested. Its key elements are a Palestinian state based more or less on the 
pre-1967 borders (with some negotiated modifications and land-swaps), a 
Jerusalem shared between the two countries and a recognition that for all 
but a symbolic handful refugees, the right of return will be to a new Pales-
tinian state, not Israel. Political leadership to implement the road map and a 
clearer sign of the final dimension of a future viable, contiguous and peace-
ful Palestinian state have been missing. The coincidence of the start of a 
second Bush administration, the change in Palestinian leadership and the 
Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip next year make some adjust-
ments of the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process inevitable. The 
yardstick of the seriousness of President Bush to re-engage aggressively in 
the peace process will be whether    
•  Ariel Sharon´s policy of unilateral disengagement from Gaza does not 
become Gaza only,  
•  the successor of Yassir Arafat will be capable of meeting the most 
pressing political, security and economic needs of the Palestinian peo-
ple,  
•  the Islamist militia (Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad) do not take advan-
tage of the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and continue their fighting 
against Israel unabated,  
•  and Gaza does not become a failed state.  Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections 
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President Bush has to demonstrate how to proceed from Israel´s Gaza-plus-
formula, if it is implemented, towards an independent Palestine. Washing-
ton will ultimately have to decide if Gaza first becomes Gaza last, as the 
Israel´s prime minister Ariel Sharon seems to prefer,
40 or if the withdrawal 
in 2005 will be the first step towards a comprehensive settlement that in-
volves the West Bank. A joint American-European statement which deter-
mines the goalposts of the road map should provide both parties a more 
concrete vision of the peace process and would help to attenuate the hatred 
on both sides and to generate support for the peace process. After the death 
of Yasser Arafat, it is the time for America and Europe to emphasize the 
importance of Palestinian elections in January 2005. They would not only 
be important for Palestinian stability but could also provide the basis for 
both parties to resume a dialogue. Those responsible for planning and hold-
ing the elections would have to coordinate them with the Israeli military to 
allow Palestinians living in Jerusalem to participate and to ease conditions 
in the West Bank and Gaza so that Palestinians can more easily vote 
there.
41 The leadership change opens the door to resume talks with the new 
Palestinian leadership. With the withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza strip 
next year there is a urgent need to work out a “street map”, a series of po-
litical arrangements worked out with Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians to 
have moderates run Gaza and its security forces. If the extremist Palestin-
ian groups continue their attacks on Israelis as they pull out from Gaza, no 
Israeli prime minister would be prepared to proceed from the Gaza-plus 
formula towards an independent Palestine. Without an end to terrorism, 
there is no reason for Israel to trust the Palestinian leadership with negotiat-
ing a future state. On the other hand, Israel has to recognize that certain 
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concessions would be necessary to empower a consolidated, moderate, au-
thoritative leadership.
42 
In concert with an re-engaged U.S. policy in the peace process the Euro-
pean allies can play a vital role in providing for a stable and secure envi-
ronment that is conducive to the build-up of a democratic Palestinian state 
based on the rule of law and a negotiated settlement between Israelis and 
Palestinians. The departure of Yasser Arafat offers the Palestinians the op-
portunity to participate in democratic elections. A democratically elected 
leadership that respects the rule of law is the key to genuine reforms to cre-
ate a viable state the Bush administration so strongly argued for. Democ-
ratic structures will enable the security apparatus to become a true law en-
forcement body capable of providing security for the Palestinians and fight-
ing terrorism. After the death of Yasser Arafat, Europe´s primary responsi-
bility is to ensure legitimate elections in Palestine that will open the door to 
genuine democratic reform as the key precondition to a just and peaceful 
solution of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on two democratic states 
– Israel and Palestine. The Europeans should support and encourage the 
Palestinian Authority in its quest for establishing a democratic society. 
They could provide the resources and expertise that will help to advance a 
viable political and economic, and security infrastructure in the West Bank 
and Gaza.
43 Finally, NATO could play a critical role in bringing greater 
stability to the Middle East by using its peacekeeping expertise and assets 
to support a peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. With Israel 
planning to withdraw from Gaza in less than a year, NATO peacekeeping 
may become a realistic option.
44 
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In conclusion, a peaceful solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict depends 
on four elements:  
•  the emergence of a democratic and capable Palestinian Authority;  
•  the willingness of the Israeli government to engage in serious negotia-
tions with the Palestinians, including the territory in the West Bank;  
•  the readiness of the Bush administration to take an active role in the 
Middle East peace process; 
•  the constructive engagement of the European allies to help the emerging 
new Palestinian leadership to consolidate and maintain authority and 
control.     
The Israeli-Palestinian stalemate feeds Muslim anger and despair, gives a 
larger rationale to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and to the insurgency in 
Iraq, makes the promotion of democratic reform in the broader Middle East 
an elusive goal, and threatens a spill-over of violence from the Middle East 
to Europe. The United States and the European allies should seize the op-
portunity of new circumstances in the region to reduce the incentives to 
violence and instability and increase the odds of a just and peaceful resolu-
tion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on two democratic states. 
3.   Nuclear Diplomacy: Iran 
Iran is becoming the test case both for the transatlantic allies of how to deal 
with the enforcement of nuclear nonproliferation rules. The dividing line 
between the United States and the European partners is  how to respond to 
efforts by “rogue” countries to acquire a WMD capability. While the Bush 
administration prefers a tough approach which does not take any option off 
the table, including economic sanctions and the concept of military pre-
emption, the European allies are determined to change Iran’s nuclear policy 
and to supplement the shortcomings of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) through “conditional engagement”. 
 Franz-Josef Meiers 
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A previous deal that the EU-3 thought they had struck in October 2003 
with Iran to suspend its uranium and plutonium programs unraveled when 
IAEA inspectors uncovered  many previously hidden activities in violation 
of the NPT Treaty which could be related to weapons program, including 
the reprocessing of uranium and advanced designs for uranium-enriching 
centrifuges, and Teheran, in response to the revelation, refused to end its 
manufacture of parts for uranium enrichment machines and production of 
plutonium. Iran´s apparent willingness to cooperate only when confronted 
by the IAEA with compelling evidence confirmed the suspicion of the 
Bush administration that Teheran is hiding a plan to develop nuclear weap-
ons under the cover of its civilian nuclear program. Because of  the scale 
and history of the Iran´s nuclear program Washington argued that Iran has 
not made any strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program. 
Instead it used negotiations with the EU-3 as a pretext to continue its nu-
clear program in private without impunity. The only way to stop Iran´s nu-
clear program is to force the issue to the U.N. Security Council for possible 
economic sanctions.
45 The Iranian nuclear program raises two delicate po-
litical problems for the transatlantic allies: the need to strike a balance that 
addresses both the proliferation concerns of Americans and Europeans and 
to recognize the rights of Iran within the NPT Treaty to enrich uranium for 
peaceful purposes, and whether nuclear diplomacy can still supplement the 
shortcomings of the NPT Treaty that allows the development of all enrich-
ing or reprocessing of uranium for generating electricity but can be used for 
making a nuclear bomb.  
Rather than refer Iran to a divided Council, France, Great Britain and Ger-
many (EU-3), with the reluctant blessing of the United States, offered the 
Iranian government a second tentative deal
46 in late October 2004 to aban-
don its uranium enrichment program in exchange for receiving nuclear 
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technology, i,e, , guaranteed access imported nuclear fuel at market prices, 
the removal of spent fuel, light water reactor systems ill-suited for develop-
ing fissile material for nuclear bomb a lucrative EU-Iran trade agreement 
and support for Iran´s membership in the WTO. In a letter to the govern-
ments of the EU-3 the Iranian government pledged to halt by 22 November 
2004 temporarily all enrichment, to freeze the work on its pilot plan for 
uranium enrichment in Natanz and to drop plans to convert solid uranium 
into the gas that is fed into the enrichment centrifuges during the period of 
talks with the EU-3 on the entire package deal.
47 In return, the EU-3 have 
agreed to refrain from referring the issue to the Security Council. The pact, 
however, fell far short of the comprehensive deal the  EU-3 had hoped for, 
by which Iran would permanently suspend its uranium enrichment and re-
processing program.
48 Instead, the agreement does little more than reinstate 
a temporary freeze of Iran´s most dangerous nuclear activities – a point the 
European trio thought they had reached a year ago. Iranian officials empha-
sized after the talks with the EU-3 in Paris that the suspension would not be 
indefinite and that the country would not give up its legitimate right to use 
fuel-cycle activities for solely civilian purposes under the NPT Treaty. The 
agreement still does correspond with what the ruling board of the IAEA 
demanded in September 2004: the suspension of all
49 Iranian activities re-
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lated to uranium enrichment and reprocessing. In a 32-page report, Mo-
hammed ElBaradei, the director of the IAEA, wrote that all declared nu-
clear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is 
not diverted to prohibited activities.” The agency, however, was not in the 
position “to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or ac-
tivities in Iran.”
50 
In a surprising shift, President Bush lent support to the European initiative. 
At a joint conference with British Prime Minister Blair at the White House 
he said, “We don´t want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, and we´re working 
toward that end. And the truth of the matter is the prime minister gets a lot 
of credit for working with France and Germany to convince the Iranians to 
get rid of the processes that would enable them to develop a nuclear 
weapon.” Instead of calling Iran´s case to be referred to the Security Coun-
cil for possible sanctions over Iran´s nuclear program, the Bush administra-
tion is giving EU-3 efforts the benefit of the doubt to halt Teheran´s nuclear 
ambitions in the long term by diplomatic engagement. Washington is mak-
ing a virtue out of necessity. Only two of the 35 countries on the IAEA 
board – Canada and Australia – had shown a willingness to refer Iran´s file 
to the Security Council. With the deal it appears unlikely that even these 
two countries would support the U.S. position. In addition, China signed an 
advantageous contract to extract and buy enormous quantities of Iranian oil 
and gas in late October. Together with Russia, Iran´s main civilian nuclear 
supplier, China has a veto in the U.N. Security Council to block any resolu-
tion imposing economic sanctions on Iran. In short, with a continued “get 
tough policy” policy with Iran Washington risks complete diplomatic isola-
tion both on the IAEA board and within the Security Council. Instead the 
United States will focus on several outstanding issues and pursue a toughly 
worded resolution to be issued by IAEA board on 25 November 2004 that 
includes more aggressive IAEA inspections and an automatic referral to the 
Security Council if Teheran breaks any part of the EU-3 deal. 
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The nuclear diplomacy of the EU-3 has two serious shortcomings. Tehe-
ran´s linkage policy to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to ad-
dress the perceived security concerns vis-à-vis the United States and Israel 
as potential aggressors, demonstrate the limits of a compartmentalized ap-
proach where the Europeans try to convince the Iranians to dismantle its 
full nuclear fuel cycle at the bargaining table, while the Bush administra-
tion is taking the position of a concerned spectator. The EU offer raises a 
crucial doubt for Iran: how can it be sure Washington will not one day lean 
on the Europeans to break their supply promise to Iran? This is one funda-
mental reason why any EU-Iran deal will need active U.S. support. The 
Bush administration should actively embrace the European position, and 
urge the Russians to join the common approach which supports both Ira-
nian efforts to develop nuclear power for civilian purposes in exchange for 
a comprehensive, verifiable freeze of Iran´s uranium enrichment and re-
processing program. Another reason is that a non-aggression assurance 
from Washington might lessen the incentives for Iran, which currently has 
U.S. forces to the west and east of it, to go nuclear. The Bush administra-
tion´s policy towards Iran is predicated on the belief that sustained pressure 
will make the Iranians change their policies. Furthermore, President Bush 
has made Iran a card carrying member of the “axis of evil” giving the 
United States a virtual right to wage preemptive war. “Iran will either be 
isolated or it will submit to the will of the international community,” Con-
doleezza Rice said in August 2004.
51 Hawks in the Bush administration 
even go a step further: Iran like Iraq, is a gathering threat that must be con-
fronted by military action or regime change. An administration official said 
that a military option would “never” be taken “off the table”.
52 To com-
pound the issue, Israel warned that it would not tolerate the development of 
an Iranian nuclear weapon and might be forced to consider military action 
similar to the attack against the Ozirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 if 
 
51 Quoted in: Dilip Hiro, Washington won´t get far by threatening Teheran, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 17 August 2004. 
52 Steven R. Weisman, Bush Confronts New Challenge on Issue of Iran, New York 
Times, 19 November 2004. Franz-Josef Meiers 
28   
Teheran is judged to be on the verge of making nuclear weapons.
53 Iranian 
officials  already responded that if Israel or any other country were to at-
tack any site in Iran, they could strike back at Israel with Iran´s medium-
range Shahab-3 missile, which could also hit U.S. military bases in the 
Gulf.
54 Were Iran ever to contemplate surrendering the ambition for nuclear 
weapons, it would do so only as part of a grand strategic bargain with the 
United States that provided guarantees of Iran´s security. “Why make con-
cessions to the Europeans without reciprocal measures from Washing-
ton?”
55 One reason why the EU-3 approach has not yet brought the desired 
result is the lack of positive U.S. support.  The EU trio are well placed to 
start talks with Teheran, but they will need strong U.S. backing and deep 
U.S. involvement to succeed. In short, any effective policy toward Iran re-
quires a common position of the transatlantic partners. 
If Iran backslides on the agreement with the EU-3, as it did on a previous 
one, the EU member countries should be prepared to refer the Iran case to 
the Security Council for further action, including tough economic sanc-
tions. Such a policy would clash with the EU member countries preferred 
policy of “preventive engagement” – largely negotiations and economic 
incentives - based on the optimistic assumption that issues like the prolif-
eration of WMD can be solved through “an effective multilateral system”, 
“a rule-based international order” and “well functioning international insti-
tutions.” The European Security Strategy of December 2003 leaves the 
question unanswered how they will react if, for example, the Iranian gov-
ernment refuses to abandon all elements of the country´s nuclear enrich-
ment program or if the Iranian government decides to follow the path of 
North Korea and quits the NPT treaty with the required 90 days notice and 
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turn the country´s skills and materials to the construction of a nuclear 
bomb. If the EU ends up deadlocked over how to reverse efforts of coun-
tries to acquire a WMD capability its credibility as a global security force 
will seriously suffer. Thus, Iran is becoming the test case both for the EU 
countries´ ability to change Iran’s nuclear policy through “conditional en-
gagement” and their determination of how to deal with the enforcement of 
nuclear nonproliferation rules. They need to prove that they cannot only 
agree to a more active approach in what the Solana paper defines as a cru-
cial part of the EU security strategy. They must also be prepared to take 
sterner measures against those who have broken the rules.
56 
The mantra of Washington hawks -- if U.N. sanctions fail, the next step is a 
military strike, proxy or otherwise, to destroy Iran´s nuclear installation --, 
illustrates the broader failure in Washington to understand how U.S. power 
alone cannot halt the march towards nuclear proliferation. “We are deter-
mined that they are not going to achieve a nuclear weapons capability,” 
John Bolton, Undersecretary of State, said of Iran in September 2004. What 
was not clear was how.
57 Another anticipatory military strike against sus-
pected nuclear installations in Iran is not a viable option. Solid intelligence 
on Iran, as was the case with Iraq before the invasion, is fragmentary and 
uncertain. U.S. decision makers know little about the geographically dif-
fuse nature of Iran´s nuclear sites. Furthermore, as a neighbour of both Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, Iran is well placed to stoke further the flames of insur-
gency in Iraq, especially among the Shia Muslim population, to destabilize 
Afghanistan and/or to close the Straits of Hormuz.
58 Given Iran´s strategic 
geography, the present turmoil in the Middle East, the broad hostility of the 
Muslim population in the region against the United States and the deep-
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seated aversion of many European allies against pre-emptive U.S. strikes, 
the Bush administration cannot afford to go to war with Iran. If diplomacy 
fails, tough action by the U.N. Security Council will be. Washington would 
need the full support of its key allies then. Therefore, the “Paris Agree-
ment” must be fortified to keep the Iranians honest, the Europeans effec-
tively engaged and the Bush administration firmly committed to a diplo-
matic process. This can be achieved through a U.S.-European accord laying 
out the trigger mechanisms for specified consequences if the Iranian gov-
ernment violates certain benchmarks.
59 In short, the success of nuclear di-
plomacy hinges upon the readiness of the United States and Europe to 
agree on a strategy that tips the balance of Iran´s calculation of benefits and 
risks in favour of the former. 
4.  ESDP: Complement, not Rival 
Since its inception, ESDP has generated controversy and concern, particu-
larly in the United States. From the very beginning, U.S. attitude towards 
an emerging common security and defense policy within the institutional 
framework of the EU has been ambivalent, if not antagonistic. On the one 
hand, the Bush and Clinton administration wanted a stronger European 
partner that could assume greater responsibility for and the commensurate 
burdens and risks of European security management. On the other hand, 
any effort by the European partners to beef up the institutional resources 
and military capabilities of ESDP was perceived as deliberate attempt to 
undermine NATO and weaken the transatlantic link.
60 
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At the so-called “chocolate summit” in Brussels on 29 April 2003, Bel-
gium, France, Luxembourg and Germany announced that an autonomous 
operational planning headquarters should be established outside the EU in-
stitutional setting in Tervuren, a suburb of Brussels.
61 The four govern-
ments involved were the same four that had vehemently opposed U.S. Iraq 
policy and had blocked NATO aid for Turkey in January and February 
2003. On 20 September 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair, French President 
Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder met in Berlin to 
discuss defense cooperation. All three tried hard to de-dramatize the sensi-
tive issue of a EU planning unit. At the EU summit meeting in Brussels on 
12 December 2003, the heads of state and government decided to establish 
an autonomous European planning element along the lines of the tripartite 
proposal put forward by Blair, Chirac and Schröder. An operational plan-
ning unit will be established within the existing European military staff in 
Brussels; an operational planning cell of 50 civilian and military staff will 
be added to the existing strategic planning capability. If all EU member 
states agree, this planning cell could take over the planning and command 
for operations conducted independently from NATO. So-called framework 
nations would provide, on an ad hoc basis, basic planning and command 
headquarters to be supported by the personnel and assets of participating 
allies. In addition, a European planning cell will be set up within Shape that 
could be used for operations run under the strategic guidance of EU under 
the Berlin Plus agreement – EU operations using NATO assets. In return, 
NATO will have access to the EU planning unit through liaison officers.
62 
The key question at the heart of the Tervuren spat is whether the EU should 
conduct planning and operations outside NATO’ s supervision. U.S. deci-
sion makers were deeply concerned that the Brussels proposal would estab-
lish a stronger, more integrated defense structure that would weaken the 
EU links with NATO. Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, de-
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scribed the plans as “the most serious threat to the future of NATO”.
63 One 
starts to wonder how a EU planning cell with about 50 military staff offi-
cers can threaten the very existence of the Alliance. Due to the continued 
lack of strategic assets in transportation and reconnaissance as well as us-
able soldiers, the EU can only conduct autonomous operations limited in 
scope and time as the EU operation Artémis in Congo in summer 2003 
showed. Any long-term and operationally demanding mission will rely, for 
the foreseeable future, on the assured access to NATO’s proven assets. 
Even the French, the focal point of US suspicion, do not deny this reality. 
At the special meeting of NATO’s ambassadors in October 2003, the 
French government assured U.S. diplomats that the EU-led peacekeeping 
operation Althea in Bosnia-Hercegovina would be planned and operated 
through NATO.
64 
There is a paradox in EU defense: at time where the overwhelming major-
ity of EU countries have not yet met the “headline goal” commitments in 
2003, the EU member countries following the proposals made by Chirac 
and Blair at the Franco-British summit meeting in Le Touquet on 4 Febru-
ary 2004
65, have moved the goalposts towards ever more ambitious goals:  
•  The Headline Goal 2010 commits all member countries to meet the new 
qualitative requirements of preparedness, military effectiveness, deploy-
ability, interoperability and sustainability of forces by 2010.
66  
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•  EU defense ministers committed to providing troops for 13 rapid inter-
vention units (“battle-groups“), each made up of about 1,500 special 
troops able to deploy within 10 days to international hot by the year 
2007.
67 
At present, the results have not matched the staunch rhetoric of EU member 
countries. The reality is still that the European partners have not yet mus-
tered the commensurate energy to tackle the three long-existing gaps: 
•  the spending gap: While France and the United Kingdom have made a 
national commitment to greater defense spending,
68 Germany as the 
third Musketeer has not. To illustrate the difficulties: if Germany could 
increase its defense spending to the Anglo-French level of 2.5 % of 
GDP, it would have to increase defense expenditures by more than 13 
billion euros from presently 23,9 billion euros.
69 The German defense 
budget will, however, be capped until 2007 when a modest increase of 
800 million euros is envisaged. Robert Cooper, Director-General for 
Foreign and Political-Military Relations within the EU Ministerial 
Council rightly observed, “ It is regrettable that many European gov-
ernments do not spend what is necessary for defense. This is particularly 
true for Germany. I do not have the feeling that it takes the matter really 
serious.”
70 
•  the capability gap: In spite of the deadline set by the European Headline 
Goal 2003, the European partners still lack critical military capabilities 
required for global expeditionary missions. By mid-2004, the member 
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countries have succeeded in achieving just one (NBC batallions) out of 
the 24 military capabilities considered critical in November 2001, i.e. 
strategic air-lift capabilities, air-to-air refueling, precision-guided muni-
tions, command, control and communications, sustainability and protec-
tion of forces or logistic and support.
71 At the Capability Conference in 
Brussels on 19 May 2003, EU Defense Ministers already reached the 
still valid conclusion that “… the EU now has operational capability 
across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by rec-
ognized shortfalls. …high risks arise at the upper end of the spectrum of 
scale and intensity, in particular when conducting concurrent opera-
tions.”
 72 
•  the usability gap: With 55,000 soldiers out of a total force of 1,8 million 
outside the Alliance, the European allies are maxed out. They still have 
a force structure geared toward the necessities of the Cold War era: too 
many immobile conscript troops which have to be transformed into a 
deployable and usable expeditionary force which can engage, at short 
notice, in high-intensity warfare around the globe. With about 7,700 
troops engaged in various missions on the Balkans, Afghanistan and the 
Gulf, the German armed forces with just under 300,000 troops have 
reached the end of their rope and are unable to provide further troops for 
out-of-area mission.
73  
•  The problem is that unless the EU member countries make the necessary 
investment, it will be a tall order to meet even the less ambitious force 
goals. This concerns the third Musketeer in particular. As Robert Coo-
per concluded, “Germany will be confronted with an enormous task.” 
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This would have serious repercussions for ESDP. Just as ESDP without 
the United Kingdom is pointless, so is ESDP not feasible without Ger-
many. To make ESDP a reality depends critically on the willingness of 
the third Musketeer to provide the necessary resources, capabilities and 
structures to the common effort. 
The question of whether the Union should move forward with a pioneer 
group in the realm of security and defense policy raises another serious is-
sue. ESDP including a structured cooperation in defense can only be built 
with the United Kingdom not without it. The British military capabilities 
are indispensable to any European defense initiative. Only if the United 
Kingdom is part of the leadership group can the European security and de-
fense policy progress. As French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin 
said, “There will be no Europe without European defense and no European 
defense without Britain.”
74 
While a pioneer group without the United Kingdom part of it lacks the 
power to pull the whole Union forward, the big three can give Europe fresh 
impetus and pull the whole Union forward. Agreement among the three 
Musketeers will send a powerful signal that the EU member countries can 
forcefully “speak with one voice” on matters of security and defense af-
fairs. The trilateral leadership already has proven that it can deliver results 
on security and defense policy. The big three forged a common EU policy 
on a limited military planning capability, Iran´s clandestine nuclear activi-
ties, and the formation of a 1,500 strong rapid–reaction military forces for 
peace-making missions under a U.N. mandate.
75 The involvement of the 
United Kingdom in the tripartite agreement was essential to reassure the 
Bush administration that moves of the European allies in security and de-
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fense policy do not threaten the Atlantic Alliance.
76 The inclusion of the 
United Kingdom is a recognition of France and Germany that the two 
countries no longer have the ability to speak in the name of the whole 
group and that fresh impetus in the field of security and defense depends on 
access to Britain´s diplomatic resources and military capabilities.  
The ability to act in the area of foreign and security policy  critically de-
pends on the willingness of EU member countries to agree on a common 
policy towards the United States. Notably France is asked to place her 
strategy of “multipolarity” – a code work for using the EU as a “counter-
weight” to the U.S. “hyperpuissance” – within the framework of a strategic 
consensus between the European partners and the North American ally. 
“No French influence without Europe, no German-French Europe without 
the consent of the other member countries, in particular Great Britain, and 
no powerful and influential Europe without striving to a minimal consent 
with the United States,” as Pierre Hassner succinctly summed up the bal-
ancing act of  France towards both the European partners and the American 
ally.
 77 To define ESDP as a “counterweight” against the United States 
would be counterproductive. Far from uniting the Union, it would perpetu-
ate a dividing line in the Union  between “old” and the “new” members, as 
the Iraq-crisis in 2003 aptly showed. Such a deep division would paralyze 
the Union and block any effort to strengthen ESDP. This would cause de-
light among Pentagon hawks. Their ambition is to maintain the wound be-
tween New and Old Europe, to practice a policy of divide et impera. France 
must make sure that ESDP develops in a way that does not deepen the 
New/Old Europe divide. There is little appetite within the Union for a 
Euro-Gaullist vision of a rival superpower designed as a counterweight to 
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America´s preponderant military power in a multipolar world. The United 
Kingdom, which under the premiership of Tony Blair appeared more com-
mitted to a special relationship with Washington before and after the Iraq 
war should rebuild its relationship with its most powerful European 
neighbours. While France needs to become less reflexively anti-American, 
Britain should become less unconditionally pro-American. Britain´s voice 
will have greater weight in Washington if it speaks in the name of all EU 
member countries.
78 
Conclusions: It Takes Two for Tango 
One crucial consequence of the profound change in the structure of U.S.-
European relations since the 1990s is the end of transatlanticism as we 
knew during the Cold War period. U.S. and European foreign policy no 
longer center around the transatlantic alliance to the same dominant extent 
as in the past.
79 The fundamental purpose of American foreign policy was 
to ensure that no single power would dominate the Eurasian landmass. 
With the collapse the Soviet empire in 1991 - the most serious challenge 
for territorial domination over the European landmass – disappeared. The 
principal purpose of American foreign policy had been achieved. The suc-
cessful conclusion of the Cold War competition in Europe means that the 
United States still has strategic interests in Europe but these interests are no 
longer strategically threatened. Europe´s strategic relevance to the United 
States had been reduced. Europe is no longer the locus and focus in Amer-
ica´s foreign and security policy. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 reinforced America´s strategic reorientation towards the two main 
non-European theaters: the Middle East and Asia. The United States is now 
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focused on the war against the lethal nexus of terrorists, tyrants and tech-
nologies of mass destruction. 
For Europe, the United States was its guardian and protector during the 
Cold War. With the end of the East-West divide Europe is no longer struc-
turally fixated on the transatlantic prism. Europe no longer depends on U.S. 
security guarantees for its very existence. The principal focus of European 
foreign policy is both on deeper cooperation among existing members and 
enlargement of the Union to incorporate many of the neighboring countries 
in the east. And the member countries are determined to give the Union the 
institutional and military capabilities to transform it into an credible and 
effective actor on the global stage. In short, the new age of global politics 
has replaced the familiar transatlantic world of the Cold War. 
The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 were a paradigm-shattering event 
that caused President Bush and many in his administration to look at the 
world in an entirely different way. He and his administration came to the 
conclusion that long-held assumptions of U.S. foreign policy have to be 
realistically reappraised in light of the fact that “America is at war”. The 
events of 9/11 have caused American leaders to realize that those interna-
tional institutions established after World War II as currently structured and 
operated cannot protect the United States and its people against the most 
serious threats. The military invasion of Iraq without the consent of the in-
ternational community underlines the growing proclivity in U.S. foreign 
policy to move beyond the framework of liberal institutionalism and act 
forcefully and, when necessary, alone in the long-term global war against 
terrorism to prevent a future catastrophe, 9/11 on a larger scale.
80 As re-
gards the alliance, the Bush administration prefers to retain both decisional 
autonomy and operational discretion. The handling of the Afghanistan cri-
sis – particularly its unwillingness to use NATO – indicated that the ad-
ministration was downgrading NATO in its strategic planning and began to 
regard it as a “toolbox” from which Washington can selectively draw as it 
sees fit. It is also increasingly tempted to replace the U.S. long-standing 
 
80 John J. Amre, America on the Edge of an Uncertain Future, in: Werner Weidenfeld 
et al. (eds), From Alliance to Coalition – The Future of Transatlantic Relations, 
Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers: Gütersloh 2004, pp. 127-140 (139-140). Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections 
  39
support for European integration by a policy of divide and rule which gives 
a clear preference to those EU members  representing the “new” Europe 
while punishing or ignoring the members of the “old” Europe, namely 
France and Germany.
 81 In short, there is a widespread belief within the 
Bush administration that the United States can remake the world if only it 
is tough enough, persistent enough, and willful enough.
82  
This preference of an assertive, unilateralist, force-oriented approach will 
be counterproductive. The end of old transatlanticism did not change the 
old fact of the transatlantic security system that the new security threats 
demand collective power and common action. Even the most powerful 
country like the United States cannot manage the new transnational threats 
of international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed 
states and organized crime without the support of other countries, espe-
cially Europe. A unilateral policy is undermining America´s legitimacy. As 
Zbigniew Brzezinski concludes, “The global credibility of American mili-
tary might has never as high as it is now; yet never was its global political 
credibility more damaged.” The use of NATO when NATO is thought use-
ful, namely as coalition of the willing, is undermining the core principle on 
which the alliance rests: the solidarity of its members to act together in re-
sponse to a common threat. A strategy of divide and rule would be self-
defeating. It would undermine U.S. soft power among European allies and 
further reduce the leeway that European allies have to help the United 
States. Their support provides the necessary resources and legitimacy to 
sustain U.S. foreign policies and to tackle common threats together. Indeed, 
a stronger Europe, better able to deal with threats and conflicts of the 21
st 
century, ought to be in America´s interest.
83 
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The Euro-Gaullist vision of ESDP designed as a counterweight to the 
United States would be counterproductive as well. France gains nothing 
from balancing the “hyperpuissance” but a divided and deadlocked Union 
which will do no good to further France´s global ambitions through a 
strengthened ESDP. Therefore, the maxim should be to strengthen the EU 
as credible and effective global actor which can assert itself vis-à-vis the 
United States without building it up to a bulwark against the United States.  
The other Achilles heel of ESDP the big gap between ambition and reality. 
One reason why ESDP lacks credibility in Washington is its preoccupation 
with institutional engineering rather than the availability of usable and de-
ployable capabilities wherever needed. The terror attacks of 9/11 have un-
derlined the urgency of providing the Union with effective capabilities to 
meet the threats of the 21
st century alongside the Alliance. Only a EU 
which transforms itself into an effective and decisive global actor will be a 
respected, useful and, hence, relevant partner for the United States.
84 In 
short, boosting the global role of the EU in security and defense affairs in 
collaboration with the United States depends on four essentials: 
1.  A common strategy to act on clearly defined common goals and means 
to achieve them. 
2.  The political will to act together according to principles of a common 
strategy. 
3.  The availability of adequate military capabilities that rise to the new se-
curity challenges of the 21
st century and assure that the EU can act in 
those extreme cases. 
4.  The strengthening of a global partnership between Europe and the 
United States, which reflects the experience of the past five decades that 
only together can Europe and America master the multifaceted chal-
lenges of a globalized world in the 21
st century. 
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The changing structure of transatlantic relations requires a new basis lest 
the continued drift end in separation and ultimately, divorce. The signs are 
there that the Americans and Europeans can learn from failure and move 
ahead. The Bush administration appears to be ready open the chapter of a 
new transatlanticism based on the recognition that the successful manage-
ment of the new threats and challenges stretching from the stabilization of 
Irak and Afghanistan, the reinvigoration of the Middle East peace process 
to the control of Iran´s nuclear program do require common action. Cir-
cumstances in all three – the prospect of Iraqi elections, Iran´s apparent nu-
clear concession, and the death of Yasser Arafat – are driving the United 
States and its European allies together in a beneficial direction. In all of the 
three areas, U.S. and European strategic interests coalesce. President Bush 
stands a chance of success in all three areas only if he reaches out to allies. 
Europeans can gain from working with the Bush administration to achieve 
their joint objectives. The transatlantic dispute then is over how to achieve 
them. Only by working together can both sides of the Atlantic capitalize on 
what Timothy Garton Ash describes as “historic chance”, namely working 
in concert “to go beyond the ´free world` of the old West and lay the foun-
dations of a free world.”
85  Or as President Bush put it at a news conference 
with British Prime Minister Blair at the White House on 12 November 
2004, „The world is better off, America is better off, Europe is better off, 
when we work together.”
86 
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